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1Abstract
Zimbabwe has recently experienced record hyperination of 80 billion
percent a month. This paper uses new data from Zimbabwe to investi-
gate money demand under hyperination using an ARDL estimation for
the period 1980-2008. The results produce plausible convergence rates and
long- run elasticities, indicating that real money balances are cointegrated
with the ination rate. Evidence is also presented that suggests prices are
being driven by increases in the money supply rather than by changes in
price setting behaviour. The paper additionally uses the estimated elastic-
ity on the ination variable to calculate the maximum level of seigniorage
revenue that could be raised in the economy. Actual seigniorage levels
increased dramatically after 2000, with ination eventually exceeding the
rate required to maximize this revenue stream. This is discussed in rela-
tion to international nancing constraints and the collapse of the domestic
tax base.
J.E.L classication: E31, E41, E42, E58, E62, E63, E65, O24
Keywords: Hyper Ination, Cointegration, Money Demand, Parallel
market exchange rate, Zimbabwe
21 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In January 2009 almost ten years of high ination came to an end in Zimbabwe.
Since 2001 Zimbabwe had experienced rates of ination above 100% annually,
since 2006 this rose over 1,500% annually. Using a newly created price series we
show that in September 2006 monthly ination exceeded 50 percent per month
entering an extended period of hyperination, as dened by Cagan (1956).1
The authorities in Zimbabwe view the recent high ination period through
two prisms. First they maintain that the private sector bid up prices specula-
tively in order to maximise prots and exert extreme pressure on the economy.
`Speculation has surfaced at an alarming pace in virtually all
sectors of the economy, with the demand for cash in the economy
rising at astronomical rates, as people are positioning themselves to
take advantage of rent-seeking opportunities.' RBZ (2006)
Second they maintain that negative aid shocks and international sanctions
have contributed to the economic decline since 2000, including the high ination
rate. Zimbabwe has experienced development assistance and external nancing
shocks as access to International Finance Institution (IFI), European Union
etc, assistance has been withheld from the country.2 This explanation suggests
that printing money is one way the authorities have sought to nance the gap
between expected government revenue (including grants and aid) and actual
receipts.
`Over the past 4 years the Central Bank has maintained that the
declared and undeclared sanctions are one of the main hindrances to
our collective eorts to turning around the economy.' RBZ (2008)
This paper seeks to examine these explanations in more depth. A long-
run money demand function is estimated for the Zimbabwean economy. This
allows preliminary testing of the endogeneity between money and prices, where
1Cagan (1956) denes hyperination as beginning in the month the rise in prices exceeds 50
percent and ending in the month before the monthly rise in prices drops below that amount and
stays below for at least a year. Cagan himself admits that this measure is `purely arbitrary'.
This denition is however useful as a convention and serves the purpose of this paper.
2Domestic tax receipts have also declined dramatically.
3some evidence is found that increased money supply, rather than private sector
price speculation, may have driven ination in Zimbabwe. The paper then
characterises decit nancing behaviour in Zimbabwe over recent years and nds
that a precipitous decline in tax revenues did indeed spark a need for increased
domestic revenue raising. It is shown that this was met by large increases in
seigniorage revenue, especially as external nancing was not able to keep up
with the scal demand.
1.2 Methodology
First we construct a new price series, based on the parallel market rate of foreign
currency in Zimbabwe, to deate money balances and establish an ination
series. This new price series does not suer from the issues surrounding the
domestic price series, especially the publication delays of the CPI in recent
years. Until mid-2008 (beyond the estimation period of this paper) all domestic
prices were set in Zimbabwe dollars (the sole legal tender).
The initial (OLS) estimation results conrm that during periods of high
ination holdings of real money balances (demand for money) are explained
in large part by the expected ination rate, as in Cagan (1956). The impor-
tance of accounting for large shocks when estimating money demand functions
for developing economies is also illustrated. An autoregressive distributed lag
(ARDL) model, Pesaran & Shin (1999) is then estimated. This conrms initial
results and establishes a long-run (for over 26 years) money demand function
for Zimbabwe.3
Endogeneity is clearly an important issue. To investigate whether the pri-
vate sector bids up prices speculatively we test for the \self-perpetuation" of
prices following Khan (1980) as well as for Granger-causality of the money
supply in determining the price level in Zimbabwe. The self-perpetuation of
prices is rejected outright.4 Non-explosive price movements provide evidence
that increased money supply, rather than private sector price speculation, may
be driving ination in Zimbabwe. The absence of appropriate instruments for
3Previous work estimated money demand functions for periods of up to 15 years in Zim-
babwe.
4Granger-causality of prices is not rejected, though Granger-causality of money (by prices)
is also not rejected.
4exogeneity testing does weaken this nding.
To investigate the characteristics of the funding decits in Zimbabwe in
recent years the revenue raising options open to the government are examined.
These comprise domestic tax revenue, development assistance and seigniorage.
Although the total value of development assistance declined in the early 2000s
it now makes up a larger proportion (close to 20%) of total government revenue
than at any time between 1981 and 2000. Seigniorage, as a proportion of total
revenue, has also increased from 5% in 1981-1982 to over 40% between 2003 and
2007. The big story then is that total government revenue has declined by over
50% from its peak in the mid-1990s, due in large part to a precipitous decline
in domestic (primarily tax) non-seigniorage revenue.
1.3 Outline of the Paper
In Section 2 relevant theoretical literature on hyperination and the estimation
framework employed in the paper is outlined. Section 3 highlights key elements
of Zimbabwe's recent history and motivates the choice of exogenous variables to
be used in the estimation procedure. Section 4 denes the data, data issues and
data innovations. Section 5 estimates a long-run money demand function for
the Zimbabwean economy and tests for exogeneity of the explanatory variable.
Section 6 examines maximum and actual seigniorage generated (given the es-
timated money demand function) as well as domestic government revenue and
aid data. Section 7 concludes.
52 Estimation Strategy
The estimation strategy employed in this paper consists of several steps. First
a parsimonious money demand function, similar to that used by Cagan (1956)
is estimated. An innovation in this paper results in augmentation of the basic
money demand function to include large and sustained structural shifts that
are important in the estimation of macroeconomic relationships, particularly in
developing countries. Given these controls and high persistence of the dependent
variable the estimation framework then employs an error correction formulation
to account for the model's dynamics (both long and short-run). Stability of the
price variable is then investigated. This allows inference on causality of money in
the money demand relationship, in the absence of appropriate instrumentation.
Given the estimation of a robust long-run money demand function and the
rejection of price instability this section then describes the calculation of revenue
maximising ination rates. Finally prior estimates of money demand under high
ination in Zimbabwe are noted.
2.1 Hyperinationary Money Demand Functions
Cagan (1956), the seminal work on hyperination and money demand, notes
that hyperination allows the relationship between money and prices to be
studied in isolation to the real sector of the economy. The primary hypothesis
in the Cagan model is that changes in past and current levels of money, M,
cause the hyperination of prices, P. The Cagan demand for money function,
under hyperination is:
lnMt   lnPt =  Et[lnPt+1   lnPt] (2.1)
2.2 Sustained Structural Shocks
Estimation is initially carried out on the following log-linear model:
lnMt   lnPt =  + (lnPt   lnPt 1) + Di;t + t (2.2)
6where the error term, t captures an autoregressive process:
t = t 1 + t (2.3)
with stationary innovations, t. Di;t are dummy variables capturing large and
sustained structural shifts to the Zimbabwean economy. Capturing these shocks
is important in the estimation of money demand functions, especially in devel-
oping economies where such shocks may have large eects on macro-economic
variables of interest and where high frequency data on national income etc. are
not available. For further detail on the dummy variables included in the model
see Section 3.
There is a large literature on the impact of shocks to for example, economic
growth. However there is little work on the conict between modelling large
shocks and modelling time-series behaviour in estimating macroeconomic rela-
tionships for developing countries. This paper shows that this is nevertheless an
important issue. The persistence of the dependent variable can be overestimated
by the AR(1) term, which tends to absorb much of the explanatory power of
the exogneous variables. Excluding the AR(1) process initially (setting  = 0)
yields a very good t, as seen in Table 5, on inclusion of the exogenous vari-
ables. The persistence of the dependent variable5 cannot be overlooked however,
and subsequent estimation of an AR(1) process (setting  6= 0) and nally an
error-correction process (as   1) are carried out also.
2.3 Accounting for Dynamics
As (several) variables of interest (money and prices) are characterised by unit
root behaviour, Pesaran & Shin (1999) Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL)
cointegrating techniques are used to estimate the model in an error-correction
mechanism (ecm) framework.
5The low Durbin-Watson statistics in the initial estimation is evidence of autocorrelated
errors.




















Where t is the ination rate at time t and the other variables are as previously
described.
This estimation approach is appropriate for the relatively small sample size in
this paper (monthly data from 1980 to 2008). Pesaran & Shin (1999) show that
the ARDL approach is better than alternate estimators of long-run relationships
in the presence of large, exognenous shocks and shorter time horizons. The
ARDL model also avoids the classication of variables into I(1) or I(0).
To establish cointegration, the null of no cointegration H0 : 1 = 2 = 0
is tested against the alternative of H1 : 1 6= 02 6= 0 by means of an F-test.
The asymptotic distribution of this F-statistic is non-standard regardless of
the time-series behaviour of the underlying variables.6 Pesaran et al. (2001)
have established a set of bounds tables of appropriate critical values covering all
possible classications of the variables into I(1) or I(0). If the F-statistic lies
above the upper level of the band the null is rejected, indicating cointegration.
Once the test for cointegration is passed equation (2.4) is estimated using an
appropriate lag selection criterion, in this case Schwarz Bayesian Criteria (SIC).
Appropriate identication of the lag structure is important for identication of
the true dynamics of the model. Thus long-run estimates of the elasticities of
interest can be calculated and further diagnostic tests can be carried out.
2.4 Causality and Stability
Although Cagan's main hypothesis is that of monetary expansion driving the
price level, he did note that agents may inuence the real value of cash holdings
by bidding up or down the price level - independent of increases in the supply
of money. Speculators may thus be able to drive prices to levels that are not
supported by the expansion of the money supply, as maintained by authorities
6I.e. whether the variables are I(1) or I(0).
8in Zimbabwe.
Ideally the money supply would be instrumented for in the estimation pro-
cedure to test for the exogeneity of the money supply. In the absence of an
appropriate instrument two tests are carried out. First dynamic stability tests
are carried out on the ination rate, Khan (1980). Second Granger-causality
testing is undertaken, to test whether prices assist in predicting levels of nominal
money balances, Lutkepohl (2007).
Prices become self-perpetuating where rises in prices immediately produce
a proportionately greater decline in RMBs, causing the stability of the price-
money relationship to break down. Cagan (1956) noted that this occurs only
when the absolute slope of the demand function is is high or the lag in expecta-
tions is very short. This provides a mechanism to test for the causal relationship
between money and prices in the model.
Khan (1980) establishes a continuous time model to test for self-perpetuating







[   lnPt    ln
Mt 1
Pt 1
] + ut (2.5)
To examine the conditions required for stable (in the sense of Khan and Cagan)
prices this is maximised with respect to ination. The necessary and sucient
condition for stability of the ination rate turns out to be:
1    < 0 (2.6)
or equivalently,  < 1.7 Estimating (2.5), results in three parameters and
three unknowns. Solving for  and  allows us to test for stability of prices
directly.
We can also test for the relationships between money and prices in the
Granger-causality sense. This is carried out by estimating an ARDL model for
prices regressed on the nominal money supply and vice versa. Insignicant error
correction terms indicate weak exogeneity (pre-requisite to accept exogeneity in
the Granger-causality sense) whilst insignicant lagged level variables indicate
a rejection of Granger-causality.
7Further details of this model can be found in Khan (1980).
92.5 Seigniorage Revenue
Cagan (1956) notes that increases in the supply of money allow governments
to raise seigniorage revenue. Governments are able to purchase non-monetary
(real) goods, services and assets using newly issued money. This real revenue
stream is measured as the dierence in the stock of money in the economy,
deated by the price level (LHS (2.7)). It is calculated as the sum of ination
tax proceeds (rst term on RHS of (2.7)) and the change in the holdings of
real money balances (second term on RHS of (2.7)). The left hand-side of this






















Equation (2.7) indicates that there are limits to the amount of real revenue
governments can raise by issuing new money. High ination results in reduced
holdings of real money balances, shrinking the eective tax base for this revenue
stream.8 Looking only at situations of constant rates of money growth the
seigniorage revenue maximising rate of ination can be found directly from the




) =     (2.8)
Where  = pt+1,  is the parameter of interest (the semielasticity of demand
for money with respect to prices) and  is a constant.













= rate per period with continuous discounting
8Similarly, during low ination governments may not be raising as much revenue as is
possible if they were to increase the money supply even marginally.
10This `tax' is easy to collect. And if the tax rate on printing money increases
rapidly enough, revenue can exceed the theoretical maximum under constant
tax rate situations (this as people fail to anticipate the money supply increases
quickly enough).
Here the revenue maximising ination rate is established for the Zimbab-
wean economy and the sources of government nancing decomposed to examine
the relative importance of tax, seigniorage and external (ODA) nancing for
authorities between 1980 and 2007.
2.6 Money Demand Estimation for Zimbabwe
Previous work on money demand estimation in Zimbabwe to mention includes
Munoz (2006) and Kovanen (2004). Both estimate superconsisent OLS param-
eters (after testing for cointegrating relationships) in an Engle-Granger frame-
work for money demand over the period (and sub-periods within that) of the
country's independent history. Kovanen estimates a money demand function
for the period 1980-1995. Munoz nds signicant parameter estimates over a
shorter time-period in the early 2000s.
It is shown that the estimates here fall within the range of estimates in Munoz
(2006) and Kovanen (2004), which strengthens the validity of the results.
113 Exogenous Events Aecting Money Demand
In the Cagan (1956) model for money demand under hyperination, the ination
rate is the primary determinant of real money balances (RMB) in periods of high
ination. In Zimbabwe there are are several classes of exogenous country-wide
shocks that have similarly large eects on macroeconomic variables. These ex-
ogenous shocks are employed as a result of a lack of conventional macroeconomic
variables available at the desired frequency (monthly) for this economy. These
six dummy variables assist in co-determining the equilibrium level of RMB in
our estimation of a demand for money function.
These variables are climatic (drought), political (post-independence boom,
civil war, judicial crisis) and economic (exchange rate appreciation and exchange
rate auction). A brief outline of each is carried out below.
3.1 Drought
The country (traditionally drought-prone) has faced ve major droughts be-
tween 1999 and 2008. These aected the agricultural harvests in 1999/2000,
and the four harvests between 2001 and 2005. These droughts are likely asso-
ciated with changes in the price level and thus changes in the holdings of real
money balances. Dore et al. (2008) notes that droughts have had large negative
eects on growth and other variables throughout Zimbabwe's history.
3.2 Political Factors
A recent report (Dore et al. 2008, p.8) notes that \exceptionally high growth
rates" followed Zimbabwe's immediate post-independence period. Growth of
10.7% and 9.7% were recorded for 1980 and 1981 respectively. It is expected that
this high growth phase would have positively aected macro-economic variables
including the price level. This describes the Post-Independence Boom variable.
Similarly Civil War can be expected to negatively aect macroeconomic
variables exogenously. (Stoneman & Clie 1989, p. 47) describes the \consol-
idation of the ZANU government"9 as including \strong-arm methods used to
9The Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU - PF) is the party of
Robert Mugabe, current president of Zimbabwe.
12pacify the local [Matabele] population" in reaction to acts of terrorism by \dis-
sidents" in rural Matabeleland after three cabinet members were dismissed in
1982.
The Judicial Crisis is also expected to co-determine RMBs in Zimbabwe.
This variable measures the time-period coinciding with the resignation of several
senior judges in Zimbabwe and thus increasing domestic political instability.
This as a result of the government stating its inability to \guarantee the judges'
safety" (Carver 2002, p.8) in the face of opposition to the Supreme Court nding
that the fast track land reform programme (FTLRP) was unconstitutional,
Zimbabwe's involvement in the DRC war occurred between August 1998
(governments of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe agree to assist the Kabila gov-
ernment after a meeting in Harare) and October 2003 (second round of elections
held after an ocial cease-re and formation of a transitional government). Zim-
babwe's involvement included increased military spending placing further pres-
sure on the domestic budget during this time, Dore et al. (2008). As is Civil
War, DRC war can be expected to negatively aect macroeconomic variables
exogenously.
Elections have increasingly been associated with times of domestic political
tension and upheaval and can be expected to aect macroeconomic variables
exogenously. Elections occur roughly every ve years in Zimbabwe. This dummy
registers `one' in the month in which parliamentary, presidential or referenda
elections were held between 1980 and 2008, there have been 11 instances of
elections taking place in Zimbabwe over the time period of interest covering
13 parliamentary, presidential or referenda elections (some elections were run
concurrently).
3.3 Economic Factors
The Zimbabwean authorities have controlled the exchange rate in Zimbabwe
for much of the last 28 years (and under the Smith government since 1965)
using exchange control and centrally managed allocation of foreign currency.
Except from April 1995 to December 1997, aligning the domestic exchange rate
with a specic currency was seldom undertaken. During the mid-1990s the
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe pegged the value of the Zimbabwean dollar to the
13US dollar, Mabugu (2001), leading to real appreciation. Although there were
limits on the amounts of foreign currency that could be purchased, this period
saw convertibility of the ZWD internationally and market determined allocation
of foreign reserves. The dummy variable capturing this is ER Peg Period. This
commitment to an exchange rate peg and the liberalisation of the allocation of
foreign exchange had large eects on several macroeconomic variables, including
the price level.
The early 2000s saw the return to centrally allocated foreign currency and
a xed exchange rate with intermittent devaluations. The result was non-
convertibility of ZWD abroad, local shortages of foreign exchange as well as
a return to centralised allocation these reserves. So it was with much fan-fare
that a system of foreign exchange auctioning was established by the Reserve
Bank at the start of 2004. This was to allocate scarce foreign exchange to
the highest bidder (defacto oating exchange rate) and a return to market de-
termined allocation of foreign currency. Exchange Rate Auction captures this
event. The introduction of the auction system coincides with a signicant alter-
ation in expectations regarding exchange rate policy. This would be captured by
conventional macroeconomic variables (the real exchange rate, national income,
the price level) if there were available at the required frequency.
3.4 Summary of Structural Change Variables
Exogenous dummy variables to be included in the money demand function in-
clude:
 Drought: runs for 13 months from November in each of the years 1982,
1984, 1991, 1999, 2001-2005.
 Independence: April 1980 to June 1983
 Civil war: January 1983 to June 1985
 Exchange rate appreciation: April 1995 to January 1997
 DRC War
 Election Dummies
14 Judicial crisis: February 2002 to March 2003
 Exchange rate auction: January 2004
 DRC War: August 1998 to October 2003
 Elections: Usually March but occasionally February and/or June in the
years 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 1996, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2008.
154 Data and a New Price Index
In this section we outline the variables and data sources employed in this paper.
We also discuss several issues encountered in constructing the data set. These
include timing issues, the quality of the Zimbabwean CPI, use of alternative
price series (criteria are established for an alternate price series) and merging
three alternate price series to yield our new price index.
4.1 Data
Data is monthly from January 1980 to early 2008.10 The variables of interest
are:11
 The consumer price index (CPI), money (M1) and three-month time de-
posit rate:
 Parallel market exchange rate (CER) data:
 Government budget12 and overseas development assistance data13 (ODA):
 Stock market returns:
 Imports, trade-partner exports to Zimbabwe:
Ination (and stock market returns) are measured as the log dierence over
12 months (using monthly data). These moving averages dampen the volatility
of monthly rates of change and abstract from seasonality issues. Real money
balances are constructed by deating the money supply by the CER. Budget
data is deated by the CER. DAC and trade data is denominated in USD by
the OECD and IMF respectively.
Table 1 shows that the mean of these variables has changed considerably
in the last decade. This coincides with large increases in ination rates and
declining real money balances seen in Zimbabwe since 2001.
10All ZWD denominated data is transformed to reect the 2006-2008 dollar, i.e. in August
2006 three zeros were removed from the currency and in August 2008 ten zeros were removed
from the currency to allow reintroduction of lower denomination notes in order to cope with
the very high rates of ination.
11See Appendix A for details on the sources of these variables.
12Budget data is annual from 1980-1997, quarterly from 1998-2005Q2 and monthly from
2006-2007.
13Aid data is annual.
16Table 1: Summary Statistics, by Decade
Log Ination Ination 3mnth log(real stock
(RMB) rate rate deposit imports) market
(using CER) (using CPI) rate returns
1980-2008
Mean 6.21 1.00 0.80 3.01 -0.58 0.65
Maximum 7.17 23.35 14.65 5.65 0.64 6.83
Minimum 4.63 -0.58 0.03 1.25 -3.34 -4.49
Observations 337 333 331 333 333 333
1980-1999
Mean 6.32 0.19 0.19 2.65 -0.40 0.17
2000-2008
Mean 5.93 2.76 2.14 3.93 -1.04 1.70
Source: Authors calculations.
4.2 Real Money Balances
The dependent variable in our money demand estimation is a measure of real
money balances (RMB). The quality of the price series has a major impact on
the construction of this variable. The domestic price series will include bias due
to diculties surrounding data collection and implementation of appropriate
price updating techniques. This signals dierences between the actual CPI and
the measured CPI.14
A mis-match between the money and price data collection techniques also
aects the RMB variable during accelerating ination. This occurs due to money
being an end of period variable and prices a mid-period variable. However, this
timing mis-alignment is far outweighed by the quality of the CPI, especially as
ination accelerates.15
These two issues surrounding CPI quality have become more pronounced in
recent years, coinciding with accelerating ination rates and seemingly resulting
in large increases in RMB, for example in Figure 3. Munoz (2006) adds that the
inclusion of controlled prices and exclusion of goods traded on the parallel mar-
ket also aect the quality of the measured versus the actual CPI. That said, even
the (awed) CPI series shows the rapid acceleration of ination since 1999 with
two distinct phases of very high ination. Figure 116 shows that in early 2004
14Separately, as hyperination set in the CSO faced increasing delays in publication of its
monthly series which is required in increasingly high frequencies as ination accelerates.
15Author will provide evidence of this timing misalignment and its relative importance to
the CPI quality issue on request.
16This shows a moving average annual rate of change based on 12 monthly log dierence
growth rates.
17ination peaked at around 700% per year (when using log dierences) before
declining signicantly in mid 2005. Almost immediately after this decline the
ination rate began a rapid acceleration however which has not as yet peaked.
This acceleration stalled briey in 2006 and again in 2007 but rapidly moved the
country to a state of hyperination (as measured by the CPI) in March 2007.
Figure 1 also indicates that ination (based on the CPI) has not been low or
stable for much of Zimbabwe's history, even prior to the large increase in the
ination rate post-2000.

















































































































































































































4.3 Alternative Price Series
In recent years a variety of price indices have emerged as alternatives to the
Zimbabwean CPI. Table 2 records monthly ination rates for six price series
available for the last part of 2008, briey described below. These are available
daily.
There are three series relating to the price of US dollars: the `Inter-Bank
Rate' is the rate of foreign exchange available through the banks, this is higher
than the ocial exchange rate and available only in certain circumstances, for
example to some exporters for the purchase of inputs, Robertson (2008); the
18`Old Mutual Implied Rate' (OMIR) is the implied exchange rate given the price
of an Old Mutual Share dual listed on the Harare and London stock exchanges
(adjusted by the USD/GBP exchange rate); and the `Parallel Rate' is the rate
paid by businesses for foreign currency on the parallel market. The nal two
series relate to the price of goods and services when paid for by cash, `Cash
Value' or via the banks' payment systems, the Real Time Gross Settlement
(`RTGS') rate.17 Finally the `Hard-Boiled Egg Index' measures the daily price
of a hard-boiled egg. This represents prices of basic goods purchased in small
quantities by low income families in Zimbabwe, Robertson (2008).
The range of alternate series available at the end of 2008 reinforces the idea
of the requirement for a price series other than the domestic CPI.
Table 2: Alternate Price Series
Inter-Bank Old Hard- Cash RTGS Parallel
Rate Mutual Boiled Value Rate Rate
2008 Implied Rate Egg Index
August 1 7.15 67.6 35.0 14.9 89.9 90.0
September 1 37.15 1,810.3 350.0 199.1 3,000.6 3,000.0
October 1 138.14 5.9E+05 3,500.0 2,500.0 9.2E+05 1.0E+06
October 21 290.12 3.07E+08 70,000.0 31,000.0 1.01E+08 3.00E+08
John Robertson, Robertson Economic Services.
4.3.1 Establishing a New Price Index
Use of alternate deators for the construction of the real money balance variable
is common in the literature. For example, Bernholtz (2003) suggests that using
the exchange rate series as the money deater may improve on the domestic
price series available, especially during periods of very high ination. This may
be applicable to Zimbabwe, where price pass-through from imports to domestic
prices may be rapid. This strengthens the information content of the paral-
lel market exchange rate series in forming ination expectations since 2000 as
transactions increasingly occur on the `parallel' or black market and are thus
not captured by the CPI.
The following criteria have been established to rank the various alternate
price and parallel market exchange rate variables in an attempt to locate the
most appropriate price series for use in this paper. These criteria comprise:
17this price series is higher than the `cash value' as the RTGS system took several days to
clear, and so the currency's devaluation in the intervening time is priced into the cost of using
this method.
19high frequency availability, available for a long time period, limited delays in
publication, `basket' of goods updated regularly,18 wide availability, wide use,
and can be seen in Table 3. Of the price series listed only Parallel Rate, and
WCY (World Currency Yearbook) fulll all of the six criteria. These are both
measures of foreign exchange on the `parallel' market. The merging (details be-
low) of these series comprises the new price index for Zimbabwe, the Composite
Exchange Rate series (CER) is established. The new series is available monthly
from January 1980 to January 2008.
Table 3: New Index Quality Criteria
High Time Publication Regularly Represent Widely
Frequency Period Delays Updated ative Available
Basket Basket
CPI y y y n n y
Interbank y n n y y n
OMI y y n y y y
Hard-Boiled Egg y n n y n n
Cash y n n y n y
RTGS y n n y n y
Parallel Rate y n y y y y
Farm Comp y n n y y n
WCY y y n y y n
The ocial rate has diverged from the CER signicantly at many points in
the last 28 years, except during the mid-1990s when the government maintained
the real value of of the ZWD at the level of the USD (between April 1995 and
January 1997) Mabugu (2001). Figure 2 shows the parallel market premium
(Ocial ER/CER) for 1980-2008. A dramatic divergence occurred between the
ocial and parallel market exchange rates several times prior to the dramatic
divergence volatility in this series since 1999, as the series approaches zero.
4.3.2 Merging Three Series
Having established a set of quality criteria, which the the new price index meets,
there remain three issues surrounding the overall validity of the CER. First there
is a gap between December 1993 and January 2000 for which neither series
records observations. This is addressed by using the Farm Compensation (FC)
series to ll this gap. Second, neither series runs for the entire time period 1980-
2008, the two series must then be merged in order to obtain a single price index
for the entire period of interest. This addressed by merging the over-lapping
18The basket of goods relevant to the non-CPI series relates to those products for which
the price series is applicable to.






















































































































































































































periods of each series using monthly log growth rates, dlnXt
dt .19 The CER is
then a function of three series: the Parallel rate (1999-2008), the WCY rate
(1980-1993) and the FC rate (1993-1999).
The FC series is unpublished (therefore not widely available) and quarterly
(rather than monthly).20 To test whether this series is a good summary of
the parallel exchange rate information between 1993 and 2000 the following is
carried out. First where the series overlaps with the WCY (1990-1993) and
Parallel (1999-2006) series the correlation coecients are reported. These can
be found in the data appendix, Table A1 and show high correlation between
the Parallel and FC measures (0.928) and low correlation (0.281) between the
FC measure and the WCY measure. This may in part be due to their short
overlapping time-period. Figures A1 and A221 show that FC follows the Parallel
rate and the WCY follows the broad trends of the FC measure, respectively.
Second, an error correction model is estimated between WCY and FC and
19Or rather Parallel mkt ER( 1)  e(gr) where gr is the log dierence of the ER series
when computing the series.
20Cubic spline interpolation is carried out to obtain a monthly series, details in Eviews,
version 6.
21These exchange rates are ZWD/USD where we have re-based the Zimbabwe dollar to
reect the currency used between August 2006 (when three zeros were removed from the
currency) and August 2008 (after which 10 more zeros were removed from the currency)
21between the Parallel rate and FC. The results, reported in Table A2, indicate
a signicant long-run relationship between the variables of interest with large
adjustment coecients and long-run coecients approaching one.
In light of the above discussion we adopt the novel merged series as our
alternative price index and deate M1 by this series in the main regression.
Deating M1 by the CER, is compared to deation by the domestic CPI in
Figure 3.22 The CER deated series follows the trends of the CPI deated series
between 1980 and 1997. The CER series captures a decline in RMB starting
in late 1999 and continuing to 2003. The CPI deated series records stable
holdings of RMB at this time despite the signicant increase in ination over
these years (as measured by both CPI and CER derived ination rates). The
CER deated series picks up an increase in RMB holdings at the end of 2003
and on-going until 2005, also noted in Munoz (2006). This coincides with the
introduction of an auction system for the purchase of foreign exchange (January
2004), recall Section 3. This auction system was abandoned late in 2005, Munoz
(2006). By November 2006 the level of RMB Zimbabweans were willing to hold
had slipped to below 1983 levels (the lowest level prior to this date). The recent
decline in RMB is consistent with our priors on the behaviour of agents holdings
of money balances during periods of high ination. The series in these years
is based on the `parallel exchange rate' from Techn which records the actual
parallel market rates paid by businesses and individuals each day for foreign
currency in Harare.
The Hanke Hyperination Index for Zimbabwe (HHIZ),23 has been widely
quoted in the press since the series was published in the summer of 2008. Al-
though similar to the HHIZ, as seen in Figure 4, our series runs monthly from
1980 to late 2008, and is based on a merging on three parallel market exchange
rate indices whereas the HHIZ Hanke's index is based on `market based' price
data and the authors calculation,24 and runs for only 23 months between 2007
and 2008. The two series overlap for just 21 months and follow the same trend
over this time period. The Hanke index appears to have a higher volatility than
22The RMB series is now denoted in millions of USD (as the nominal money data have been
deated by an exchange rate). The comparable CPI deated series has been rebased so that
the CPI=100 in July 1994.
23Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/zimbabwe.
24The exact nature of which is not specied on the author's website or accompanying papers.











RMB_forex RMB_CPI (rebased for comparison)
the CER, registering more pronounced declines in the series in April, July and
December 2007 as well as June 2008 than the CER.25






























































































































































Hanke Series Composite Exchange Rate (CER)
25This may, of course, be attributable to the limited data available on the HHIZ from
http://www.cato.org/zimbabwe
235 Money Demand Estimation
In this section we estimate a money demand function for the Zimbabwean econ-
omy. This allows us to test the reasons put forward by authorities there for the
hyperination in recent years.
5.1 OLS Results
Table 4 shows the baseline OLS results on a log-levels equation with and without
an autoregressive component and control variables measuring returns on wealth
held as time deposits (3 months deposit rate), stocks (stock market returns) and
cash (ination rate). The dependent variables is log(RMB). The AR(1) term
is required as the macroeconomic variables display a degree of persistence over
time. As such the AR(1) term is large and signicant when included in columns
(2-5)
As the CER is a substitute for the CPI specications (1) and (2) exclude
the CPI while (3) and (5) exclude the CER. Although of the correct sign, the
ination rate is not signicant in (3) and weakly signicant in (5).
Specication (4) comprises a conventional, baseline money demand function.
Here the CER is interpreted as the opportunity cost of holding domestic cur-
rency instead of foreign currency while CPI measures the opportunity of cost
of holding cash over goods.26 The 3-month deposit rate is not signicant and
the stock market returns variable is weakly signicant only in (4), although it
displays the correct sign. The CER ination rate is highly signicant and of the
correct sign in all specications.
Table 5 shows results on inclusion of six dummy variables relating to envi-
ronmental and policy shocks aecting the Zimbabwean economy. The coecient
on the CER ination rate is robust (in size, sign and signicance) to alteration
of the time-periods used and to the introduction of various other control vari-
ables. In Zimbabwe the level of real money balances depends negatively on the
ination rate (proxied by the price of foreign currency on the parallel market).
This is highly signicant and accounts for most of the explained variation in
RMBs over the period.
26In most instances CPI and CER are interpreted as substitutes and thus not included in
the same regressions.
24Table 4: Demand for Money: Zimbabwe, Conventional Specication
Dependent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
variable: RMB Pars AR(1) CPI Controls Controls/CPI
Ination rate -0.26*** -0.47*** -0.51***
(CER) (0.01) (0.06) (0.07)
Ination rate -0.22 0.21* -0.23*
(CPI) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13)
3mnth 0.00 -0.00
deposit rate (0.00) (0.00)
Stock market 0.07* -0.02
returns (0.04) (0.06)
Constant 6.39*** 7.15*** 6.36*** 6.45*** 6.36***
(0.03) (1.34) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16)
AR(1) 0.98*** 0.94*** 0.96*** 0.94***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Adjusted R 0.40 0.95 0.92 0.95 0.92
squared
Durbin-Watson 0.10 2.20 2.28 2.06 2.18
statistic
F-statistic 214.11 2838.84 1817.77 1222.18 903.33
Number of 325 324 324 320 320
observations
Sample 1981M01 1981M02 1981M02 1981M02 1981M02
2008M01 2008M01 2008M01 2007M09 2007M09
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance
Specication (1) introduces the dummy variables while assuming no autocor-
relation in the error term. All the dummy variables display the correct signs and
several are signicant. Drought, post-independence boom, civil war, exchange
rate appreciation and the judicial crisis also display large coecients, of the
same magnitude to that on the primary variable of interest, the ination rate.
The DRC War and Elections dummies are excluded from specications going
forward given their insignicance here. The low Durbin-Watson statistic in (1)
indicates however that the errors in this initial model are correlated. Despite
this the model display good t.
On introduction of the AR(1) term some of these dummy variables lose
signicance and drought and the ER auction no longer display the correct sign.
Specication (5) introduces the alternate ination measure, the interest rate
and the stock market returns variable. Only the stock market returns variable
is signicantand of the correct sign with a small coecient. A very tight t now
achieved, as we argue above that this is to the detriment of the explanatory
power of important shock variables.
25Table 5: OLS results, controlling for large, sustained shocks
Dependent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
variable: RMB Shocks AR(1) 1981-1999 2000-2008 Controls
Ination rate -0.43*** -0.46*** -0.48*** -0.46*** -0.52***







Drought -0.19*** 0.02 0.06*** -0.06 0.03
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) -0.05 (0.02)
Post-independence 0.49*** 0.06** 0.09* 0.06*
boom (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)
Civil war -0.23*** -0.08** -0.09* -0.10**
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
ER peg period 0.41*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Judicial crisis -0.61*** -0.21* -0.20 -0.23*
(0.07) (0.11) -0.11 (0.13)
ER auction 0.08** -0.27 0.28 0.24





Trend 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.02 0.003**
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) 0.02 (0.001)
Constant 5.83*** 5.69*** 5.64*** 2.01 5.92***
(0.03) (0.29) (0.21) -4.56 (0.23)
AR(1) 0.95*** 0.93*** 0.91*** 0.94***
(0.03) (0.03) -0.07 (0.02)
Adjusted R 0.81 0.95 0.96 0.92 0.95
squared
Durbin-Watson 0.38 2.13 2.09 2.15 2.00
statistic
F-statistic 179.94 670.45 723.03 193.56 540.06
Number of 325 324 227 97 320
observations
Sample 1981M01 1981M02 1981M01 2000M01 1981M02
2008M01 2008M01 1999M12 2008M01 2007M09
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
26As 2000 marks the onset of severe economic deterioration and the onset of
high ination there are concerns that a linear regression spanning 1980-2008
may not be able to capture potential non-linearities between the pre- and post-
2000 time periods. Specication (3) uses only pre-2000 observations while (4)
uses only post-2000 observations. the coecient on the CER term is remarkably
consistent, although the signicance and sign on the dummies of interest do not
perform well under these specications. Similar concerns regarding diculties
in tting the last few observations of the hyperination in 2008 result in the
estimation being truncated at the start of 2008.27
These regression results are an improvement on previous empirical investiga-
tions of the money demand function in Zimbabwe. We have established a robust
(in size and sign, over time) coecient on the variable proxying for the increase
in the price level (the cost associated with holding RMBs). A 1% increase in
the price level results in a 0.48% decrease in holdings of RMB. In contrast the
elasticity found by Munoz (2006) was -0.12 (for the time period 1998-2004), and
-0.66 for Kovanen (2004) (for the time period 1980-2001). The coecient in this
paper thus falls between the 2 estimates previously found.28
5.2 Cointegration
Using Equation (2.4), we estimate the ARDL error correction model. First we
test the Pesaran F-statistic against the appropriate bounding critical values
with a 12 period lag structure (appropriate to the monthly data in this model).
The ARDL model accepts cointegration between the ination rate and RMBs.
The F-statistic for the specication in Equation (2.4) is 10.74, above the relevant
1% band of 6.84-7.84. The null of no-cointegration is rejected. This rejection is
robust to a reduction in the lag structure to 1 lags, see Table 6.
For completeness augmented Dickey-Fuller tests are also carried out on the
ination rate and RMB variables. The results, in Table A4, show that the levels
of these variables do not reject the null of a unit-root while the dierenced
variables are stationary.
27This eliminates any requirement for measurement of the barter-exchange that emerged in
Zimbabwe only after January 2008.
28Estimates on the elasticity of the exchange rate (measured by the change in the parallel
market exchange rate) are -1.28 to -1.25 for these authors, respectively. These are larger
numbers than the coecients this (slightly dierent) model has produced.
27Table 6: Pesaran bounds test
Dependent F Statistics
variable Lag order 1 Lag order 12
RMB 6.12 10.74
Critical Pesaran et al (2001)1




1 Critical values are obtained from Pesaran et al (2001), Table CI (iii):
Unrestricted intercept and no trend (indicates linear trend in levels
equation and intercept for both CE and independent variables).
Table 7 shows the ARDL results. Using SIC, Microt estiamtes an ARDL(1,1).
Column (1) shows the short-run parameters prior to estimating for an error-
correction relationship, this specication diers from that in Column (2), Table5
in number of observations and AR(1) techniques. However the coecients are
of broadly similar size and signs as those in the AR(1) model (in Table 5).
Drought and the ER auction have regained the correct signs; however drought,
post-independence boom and the judicial crisis are not signicant in this spec-
ication. Specication (2) displays the long-run coecients, the elasticity on
the ination rate variable is about 40% smaller than in the short-run ARDL
model or the AR(1) model, but similar in size to the original OLS specication,
without controls and is still within the -0.12 and -0.66 range reported by Munoz
(2006) and Kovanen (2004), respectively.
Specication (3) shows the error-correction model. Crucially the error-
correction (ecm) term is signicant and negative, indicating a long-run cor-
rective process between RMBs and price movements in this model. The implied
convergence rate, 0.11, means that a shock of 1% to the RMB-ination lev-
els equilibrium is halved in about 7 months. This half-life seems reasonable
for the case-study in this paper and falls between the convergence rates in the
Asian countries Bahmani-Oskooee & Rehman (2005) examine using the same
methodology.29
Table 8 shows the stationarity of the ECM residuals and the mean-reverting
behaviour of the ECM relationship over time, respectively.
29In that paper India's rate of convergence in -0.47 whilst that of -0.01 for Thailand. These
estimates are for periods of relatively low ination but are still indicative of the range of
estimates we might expect to nd for money demand functions estimated in this way.
28Table 7: Long-run Money Demand Estimation, Zimbabwe
Dependent (1) (2) (3)
variable: RMB Short-run Long-run ARDL
Ination rate -0.48*** -0.24*** -0.48***
(CER) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04)
Drought -0.02 -0.22 -0.02
(0.017) (0.14) (0.02)
Post-independence 0.02 0.18 0.02
boom (0.04) (0.29) (0.04)
Civil war -0.06** -0.55** -0.06**
(0.03) (0.26) (0.03)
ER peg period 0.07** 0.58** 0.07**
(0.03) (0.23) (0.03)
Judicial crisis -0.04 -0.39 -0.04
(0.05) (0.37) (0.05)
ER auction 0.49*** 4.30*** 0.49***
(0.12) (1.60) (0.12)
Trend 0.003 0.002* 0.003
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Constant 0.70*** 6.15*** 0.70***
(0.17) (0.20) (0.17)
Log(RMB) - lag 0.89***
(0.03)
Ination rate 0.45***
(CER) - lag (0.04)
ECM(-1) -0.11***
(0.03)









ARDL(1,1) selected, based on Schwarz
Bayseian Criterion
(1) ARDL estimates
(2) Estimated long-run coecients
(3) Error correction representation for the selected
ARDL (1,1) model (level variables all dierenced)




ADF test one-sided ADF test one-sided
statistic p-value statistic p-value
Residuals from ARDL ECM -19.12 0 -33.17 0
Italics: reject unit root at 1% level
29Table 9: Test for Price Speculation




Ination rate -0.03*** -0.04***
(CER) (0.01) (0.01)
Log RMB - lag -0.06*** -0.11***
(0.02) (0.02)
Dummy controls No Yes
AR(1) -0.17*** 0.16***
(0.07) (0.07)
Implied alpha 0.41 3.36
Implied beta 0.06 0.11
Implied alpha*beta 0.03 0.37











5.3 Stability and Exogeneity
Recall Equation (2.5) in Section 2. This provides a test for the stability of
the ination rate over time by examination of a continuous time Cagan model,
approximated by a discrete time model which is empirically testable. Table 9
shows the results from estimation of Equation (2.5) as an AR(1) process, we
include a trend and the exogenous dummy variables in specication (2) (as in
previous specications of this model). Given the three estimated coecients on
the constant, ination rate and lagged RMB variable we can solve for the  and
 parameters as seen at the bottom of Table 9. The stability test, as derived in
Cagan (1956) and Khan (1980) amounts to a necesary and sucient condition
of  < 1. This is accepted for both model specications and provides some
evidence to reject the claim that the private sector has been bidding up prices
speculatively in Zimbabwe.
30The rst stage of a Granger-causality test is carried out in the Appendix,
Table A5. This test for weak-exogeneity indicates that there is a feedback
process between money and prices, weakening the above rejection of speculation.
In fact weak exogeneity cannot be accepted for money or prices, the error-
correction terms in both specications are signicant and negative. Until an
appropriate instrument is found to test for exogeneity of money explicitly in
this model it is dicult to conclude that speculation did or did not exist during
the high ination period in Zimbabwe in recent years.
316 Aid Shocks
In Section 5 a long-run, stable relationship between real money balances and
prices is estimated and evidence is advanced suggesting that prices are not self-
perpetuating. This indicates that price increases may be driven by increases in
the money-supply. We maintain this hypothesis in the following discussion.
We follow Cagan in calculating the equilibrium seigniorage that the govern-
ment is able to raise, should it embark on a policy of printing large quantities of
money to nance part of the domestic expenditure requirements. This is some-
thing the authorities allude to when they state that international sanctions are
to blame for the economic woes of the country.30
This section also examines aid ows to Zimbabwe since 1980. We show that
although aid levels have declined in recent years, the real story is around the
large reduction in domestic revenue (largely taxes) raised by the authorities
since 2001. This has been caused in the main part by a steep fall o in the
domestic economy, Zimbabwe having been in a severe recession since the early
2000s.
6.1 Seigniorage Maximising Ination
Recall Section 2: when assuming a steady-state money-supply increase max-
imum ination is the coecient on the ination rate. As we use an annual
moving average for the ination rate variable this will be an annual rate.31
For the period 1981-2008 the rate of ination that would maximise the rev-
enue from printing cash is 420 per cent (1/0.24 - the long-run elasticity on
ination as estimated in the ECM) per year (0.35 per month). The actual rates
of ination during the hyperinationary period September 2006 to January 2008
vs the average for 1980-2006 are 71 and 0.6, respectively. This means that before
hyperination the government was not achieving the rate of ination needed to
maximise seigniorage revenue (35% per month). After September 2006 however
the government actually over-shoots this `optimum' number and is thus printing
30`Faced therefore with the circumstances of sanctions and lack of international nancial
supportthe Central Bank's quasiscal interventions have served the people of this country as
a survival kit against total economic collapse.' (RBZ 2006, p.6)
31Use of log dierence growth rates means that dividing 1
 by 12 yields the average monthly
ination rate.
32money too quickly (592% per month) to maximise seigniorage revenue in the
steady state.
Figure 532 shows the level of seigniorage maximising ination relative to the
actual level of annual ination (using our parallel market exchange rate data as
the price series). Prior to early 2007 authorities kept price increases well below
those needed to maximise seigniorage. After March 2007 there was much less
inclination to keep below the rate of 420% per year.
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6.2 Revenue Decomposition
The domestic authorities are able to nance government spending according to
the following:
Gt = tYt + At + St (6.1)
where G is total government spending, tY is domestically raised tax revenue,
A is external nancing (ODA etc.) and S is domestically raised seigniorage
32Note: the CER ination rate shows volatile and occasionally negative ination between
1980 and 1990. This is to be expected with the exchange rate series and does not aect
estimation or inference here.
33revenue.33 Figure 6 shows the prole of actual tY , A and S as well as real
GDP, in millions of USD. The drop in real GDP is stark and is matched by a
large decline in domestic tax revenue. There is an increase in S post-1999 and
although aid levels are lower in the 2000s than they were in 1993/94 (high aid
levels due in part to the severe drought experienced by the country in 1991/92)
they have maintained their post 1994 trend throughout the 2000s.













































































Govt revenue Seigniorage ODA (excl debt) Real GDP (RHS)
ODA peaked between 1983 and 1988, making up 17% of total government
revenue. Since 1998 aid has declined in absolute terms but still makes up 18%
of total revenue. Seigniorage comprises 10% of total revenue between 1993 and
1997, rising to 22% between 1998 and 2002 and almost 41% of total revenue
between 2003 and 2007. Strikingly the period 1998-2002 is characterised by a
sharp and sustained decline in domestic tax revenue as the economy collapses
in Zimbabwe. From making up 80% of total revenue between 1993 and 1997, by
2006 tax revenue was contributing only around 23% to overall revenue available
for public spending requirements.
33Note: tax revenue is proportional in Zimbabwe. As long as the tax base is not altered
ination should raise increasing amounts of tax. Thus Tanzi eects are not pertinent to this
discussion. Although this is clearly a partial equilibrium story: we would expect given the
other large shocks in the economy that domestic nancing options become limited as the
productive capacity of the economy declines.








1981-1982 1983-1987 1988-1992 1993-1997 1998-2002 2003-2007
Millions
of USD
Seigniorage Govt Revenue ODA (total, excl debt)
Monthly domestic government revenue statistics, both non-seigniorage and
seigniorage revenue, are available from 2006-2007, see Figure A3. These show
that in mid-2006 seigniorage surpassed tax revenue as the government's most
important domestic revenue source.
Finally, Figure A434 decomposes aid disbursements into technical assistance
(proxying for non-humanitarian aid) and humanitarian aid. This addresses the
alternate hypothesis that the Zimbabwean authorities had expected (based on
past trends) that they would receive a particular level of non-humanitarian
aid to assist in their domestic nancing requirements. Humanitarian aid is
still owing into the country.35 If non-humanitarian aid were to decline sharply
post-2000 seigniorage nancing might have been used to plug this gap. The data
available show that although technical assistance to the country has declined and
humanitarian assistance has increased, that these changes in the ODA prole
available to the country are relatively small, especially when contrasted to the
large decline in GDP.
Although ODA to Zimbabwe peaked in 1992,36 post-2000 levels of total ODA
34Data from OECD, DAC.
35This is being channelled through non-governmental agencies rather than through the
government.
36This particular year shows a large increase in ODA, possibly due to the severe drought in
35have been in line with previous broad trends. The technical assistance compo-
nent is fairly steady from 2000, though there is an increase in humanitarian
aid from 2006. Aid remains a signicant but not dominant aspect of govern-
ment nancing in Zimbabwe, see Figure 7. Similarly aid has not been extremely
volatile, relative to total output and domestic nancing.
A large nancing decit has occurred in Zimbabwe since the late 1990s. This
has been increasingly funded by seigniorage. Total aid has declined somewhat,
but the collapse in tax revenue is quantitavely more important.
6.3 Alternate Explanations
Alternatively the government may have been relying on payments from the UK
government (or other international donors) to nance domestic expenditure re-
quirements post 1999 (namely land-resettlement). On embarking on the Fast
Track Land Reform Process (FTLRP) and in the absence of these funds au-
thorities may have anticipated a spending prole that they were unable to meet
without resorting to seigniorage nancing. It is dicult to quantify this argu-
ment with existing data. Although planned aid may have declined, actual aid
disbursements have not diverged from their long-run trend.
1991/92 and the emergency assistance needed in these years.
367 Conclusions
This paper has set out to address two potential (and conicting) reasons for
the hyperination currently seen in the Zimbabwean economy. First whether
private sector price speculation is driving the hyperination and second whether
large reductions in external (aid) nancing have led to authorities resorting to
seigniorage nancing of the domestic decit.
To test these we estimate a demand for money function for the country over
the time period 1980-2008 and nd that real money balances are cointegrated
with the change in the price level with plausible convergence rates and long-run
elasticities.
Our ARDL model establishes a long-run money demand relationship for
Zimbabwe for the rst time in the literature. This estimation relies on deating
the money variables by a newly constructed price series: the exchange rate for
US dollars on the parallel market.
Second the paper uses the estimated model to test for self-perpetuating
prices and feed-back mechanisms between nominal money and prices. We nd
evidence to suggest that although feed-back mechanisms do exist between money
and prices, that prices are not themselve self-perpetuating in the sample period.
Finally the paper uses the estimated elasticity on the price variable to calcu-
late the revenue maximising level of seigniorage given constant rates of money
supply growth. Seigniorage levels have increased dramatically in recent years as
other sources of (domestic and international) nancing have declined. Whereas
the decline in international nancing (ODA) has not been as dramatic as the
loss in domestic nancing as the domestic tax base has collapsed, due to the
country's economic decline. Even when external nancing (aid) is decomposed
into humanitarian and non-humanitarian assistance the decline in external as-
sistance to the government is far from dramatic.
That component of domestic revenue raised from purchasing export earnings
at cheap rates of exchange may have further been used to plug the nancing gap,
although this is dicult to quantify with exisiting data. Seigniorage nancing
(and export earnings nancing through diering rates of foreign exchange) must
be considered when attemtping to address the nancing imbalances currently
present in the economy. Thus the second potential reason for hyperination,
37printing money to alleviate nancing losses is accepted, but it is noted that
nancing losses are due to the collapse of the domestic tax base rather than the
decline in external nancing.
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Data is monthly from January 1980 to early 2008.37 The variables of interest
are drawn from:
 The consumer price index (CPI), money (M1) and three-month time de-
posit rate:
{ IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS), 1980-2007 and
{ Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) Monthly Statistics, 2007-2008.
 Composite exchange rate (CER) data:
{ World Currency Yearbooks, 1980-1993;
{ Professor A. Hawkins38 (this data is quarterly), 1994-1999 and
{ Techn (Zimbabwe), Parallel Market Rate, 2000-2008.39
 Government budget40 and overseas development assistance data41 (ODA):
{ OECD, Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 1980-2008;
{ The Economics Intelligence Unit, `Country Reports' and `Country
Prole' series, 1980-2007 and
{ RBZ, 2006-2007.
 Stock market returns:
{ IMF's IFS, 1980-1988 & 1994-1997;
{ Datastream Advance, 1988-1994 and
{ Ecowin, 2007-2008.
 Imports:
{ IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS), trade-partner exports to
Zimbabwe, 1980-2007.
A1.2 Parallel Market Exchange Rate
37All ZWD denominated data is transformed to reect the 2006-2008 dollar, i.e. in August
2006 three zeros were removed from the currency and in August 2008 ten zeros were removed
from the currency to allow reintroduction of lower denomination notes in order to cope with
the very high rates of ination.
38From an (unpublished) document compiled to establish (fair) compensation for commer-
cial farmers aected by the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP).
39This series is derived from surveying businessmen in Harare on the actual rates they used
to buy and sell foreign currency on the black market, established through correspondence with
Techn, Zimbabwe and with John Robertson, an economist in Harare, summer 2008.
40Budget data is annual from 1980-1997, quarterly from 1998-2005Q2 and monthly from
2006-2007.
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World Currency Yearbook (log difference) Farm compensation data (log difference)
42Table A2: Merging Three Series: Error-Correction Model
Dependent (1) (2)
variable World Currency Year Parallel Rate








Adjusted R squared 0.35 0.46
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.94 2.1
F-statistic 7.27 31.48
Number of observations 34 72
Sample 1991M3 2001M1
1993M12 2006M12
Note: level variables all dierenced.
1 Second dierence.
(1) ARDL(1,2) selected, based on Schwarz Bayseian Criterion
(2) ARDL(1,1) selected, based on Schwarz Bayseian Criterion
Table A3: Comparing Ination Rates
Author Hanke
log dierence % change % change
2007m1 41 50 78
2007m2 34 40 77
2007m3 116 217 56
2007m4 30 35 -2
2007m5 71 104 207
2007m6 100 173 60
2007m7 29 33 -7
2007m8 32 38 71
2007m9 42 53 165
2007m10 81 124 193
2007m11 50 65
2007m12 92 150 62
2008m1 34 40 12
2008M02 94 157 259
2008M03 80 122 114
2008M04 145 325 222
2008M05 177 488 497
2008M06 391 4,900 5,260
2008M07 289 1,700 566
2008M08 332 2,678 3,190
2008M09 570 29,900 12,500
2008m10 1,272 33,333,233 630,000,000
Source: Authors calculations and
http://www.cato.org/zimbabwe
43A1.3 Accounting for Dynamics




ADF test one-sided ADF test one-sided
statistic p-value statistic p-value
Log of RMB -2.34 0.16 -22.03 0
Ination rate (CER) 1.54 0.99 -6.73 0
Italics: reject unit root at 1% level
Table A5: Granger-Causality, Weak Exogeneity
(1) (2)









Post-independence Boom 0.09* -0.02
(0.05) (0.03)
Civil war 0.01 -0.02
(0.04) (0.02)
Fixed ER -0.02 0.00
(0.04) (0.02)








Adjusted R squared 0.11 0.32
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.16 1.97
F-statistic 5.50 17.11
Number of Observations 313 313
Sample 1982M1 1982M1
2008M1 2008M1
Note: level variables all dierenced.
(1) ARDL(1,2) selected, based on Schwarz Bayseian Criterion
(2) ARDL(2,0) selected, based on Schwarz Bayseian Criterion
44A1.4 Seigniorage Financing




































































































































































ODA: Total Net             Technical Cooperation             Total Humanitarian aid
45Institute for International Integration Studies
The Sutherland Centre, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland